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Abstract—With the explosion of Industry 4.0, industrial facil-
ities and critical infrastructures are transforming into “smart”
systems that dynamically adapt to external events. The result is
an ecosystem of heterogeneous physical and cyber components,
such as programmable logic controllers, which are more and
more exposed to cyber-physical attacks, i.e., security breaches in
cyberspace that adversely affect the physical processes at the core
of industrial control systems.
We apply runtime enforcement techniques, based on an ad-hoc
sub-class of Ligatti et al.’s edit automata, to enforce specification
compliance in networks of potentially compromised controllers,
formalised in Hennessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language. We
define a synthesis algorithm that, given an alphabet P of observ-
able actions and an enforceable regular expression e capturing a
timed property for controllers, returns a monitor that enforces
the property e during the execution of any (potentially corrupted)
controller with alphabet P and complying with the property e.
Our monitors correct and suppress incorrect actions coming from
corrupted controllers and emit actions in full autonomy when the
controller under scrutiny is not able to do so in a correct manner.
Besides classical properties, such as transparency and soundness,
the proposed enforcement ensures non-obvious properties, such
as polynomial complexity of the synthesis, deadlock- and diverge-
freedom of monitored controllers, together with scalability when
dealing with networks of controllers.
Index Terms—Runtime enforcement, process calculus, control
system security, PLC malware
I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are integrations of net-
working and distributed computing systems with physical pro-
cesses, where feedback loops allow the latter to affect the com-
putations of the former and vice versa. Historically, ICSs relied
on proprietary technologies and were implemented as stand-
alone networks in physically protected locations. However,
with the introduction of Smart Manufacturing (Industry 4.0)
the growing connectivity and integration of these systems has
triggered a dramatic increase in the number of cyber-physical
attacks [1], i.e., security breaches in cyberspace that adversely
affect the physical processes. Some notorious examples are:
(i) the Stuxnet worm, which reprogrammed PLCs of nuclear
centrifuges in the nuclear facility of Natanz in Iran [2]; (ii)
the BlackEnergy cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid [3];
(iii) the recent Triton malware that targeted a petrochemical
plant in Saudi Arabia [4]. The gravity of such attacks has
been addressed in high-level forums such as the 2018 World
Economic Forum meeting in Davos.
Published scan data shows how thousands of ICS com-


























Fig. 1. A network of compromised controllers: yi denote genuine sensor
readings from the plant, yai corrupted sensor readings sent from the PLC, u
a
i
corrupted actuator commands, and cai corrupted inter-controller communica-
tion channels.
(PLCs), are directly accessible from the Internet to improve ef-
ficiency [5], [6]. Furthermore, controllers are often connected
to each other in so called field communications networks,
opening the way to the spreading of ad-hoc worms coming
from few infected ones (see Figure 1).
Programmable Logic Controllers have an ad-hoc architec-
ture to execute simple repeating processes known as scan
cycles. Each scan cycle consists of three steps: (i) reading
of sensor measurements of the physical process; (ii) execution
of the controller code to determine how the physical process
should change according to both sensor measurements and po-
tential interactions with other controllers; (iii) transmission of
commands to the actuator devices to implement the calculated
changes. The scan cycle of a controller must be completed
within a specific time, called maximum cycle limit, which
depends on the controlled physical process; if this time limit
is violated the controller stops and throws an exception [7].
Due to their sensitive role in controlling industrial processes,
successful exploitation of a controller can have severe conse-
quences on ICSs. In fact, although modern controllers provide
security mechanisms to allow only legitimate firmware to be
uploaded, the running code can typically be altered by anyone
with network or USB access to the controllers. Thus, despite
their responsibility, controllers are vulnerable to several kinds
of attacks, including PLC-Blaster worm [7], Ladder Logic
Bombs [8], and PLC PIN Control attacks [9].
As a consequence, extra trusted hardware components
have been proposed to enhance the security of ICS archi-
tectures [10], [11]. For instance, McLaughlin [10] proposed
to add a policy-based enforcement mechanism to mediate the
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actuator commands transmitted by the PLC to the physical
plant; here, a PLC policy is expressed in terms of some
sort of regular expression. Mohan et al. [11] introduced a
different architecture, in which every PLC runs under the
scrutiny of a monitor which looks for deviations with respect
to safe behaviours. If the information obtained via the monitor
differs from the expected model(s) of the PLC, a decision
module is informed to decide whether to pass the control from
the “potentially compromised” PLC to a safety controller to
maintain the plant within the required safety margins.
Both architectures above have been validated by means of
simulation-based techniques. However, as far as we know,
formal methodologies have not been used yet to model and
formally verify security-oriented architectures for ICSs.
In this paper, we propose a formal approach based on run-
time enforcement to ensure specification compliance in net-
works of controllers possibly compromised through colluding
malware that may forge/drop actuator commands, modify sen-
sor readings, and forge/drop inter-controller communications.
Runtime enforcement [12], [13], [14] is a powerful verifica-
tion/validation technique, extending runtime monitoring [15],
[16], [17], and aiming at correcting possibly-incorrect execu-
tions of a system-under-scrutiny (SuS). It employs a kind of
monitor that acts as a proxy between the SuS and the environ-
ment interacting with it. At runtime, the monitor transforms
any incorrect executions exhibited by the SuS into correct
ones by either replacing, suppressing or inserting observable
actions on behalf of the system. The effectiveness of the
enforcement depends on the achievement of the two following
general principles [13]:
• transparency, i.e., the enforcement must not prevent cor-
rect executions of the SuS;
• soundness, i.e., incorrect executions of the SuS must be
prevented.
Our goal is to enforce potentially corrupted controllers us-
ing secure proxies based on a sub-class of Ligatti’s edit
automata [13]. These automata will be synthesised from en-
forceable timed correctness properties to form networks of
monitored controllers, as in Figure 2. The proposed enforce-
ment will enjoy both transparency and soundness together with
the following features:
• observation-based monitoring, i.e., the monitor should
only look at the observables of the controller, and not
at its internal (possibly obfuscated) executing code;
• determinism preservation, i.e., the algorithm to synthesise
the monitor should not introduce nondeterminism;
• feasibility, i.e., the synthesis algorithm should have poly-
nomial complexity in the size of the enforced property;
• deadlock-freedom, i.e., the enforcement must not intro-
duce deadlocks in the monitored controller;
• divergence-freedom, i.e., the enforcement must not intro-
duce divergences in the monitored controller;
• mitigation of incorrect/malicious activities, as in Mohan
et al.’s safety controller [11];







































Fig. 2. A network of monitored controllers.
Obviously, when a controller is compromised, these objectives
can be achieved only with the introduction of a physically
independent secure proxy, as advocated by McLaughlin and
Mohan et al., which does not have any Internet or USB access,
and which is connected with the monitored controller via
secure channels. This means that the secure proxy should be
bug-free to avoid possible infiltrations of malware.
This may seem like we just moved the problem over to
securing the proxy. However, this is not the case because the
proxy only needs to enforce a timed correctness property of
the system, while the controller does the whole job of con-
trolling the physical process relying on potentially dangerous
communications via the Internet or the USB ports. Thus, any
upgrade of the control system will be made to the controller
and not to the secure proxy. Of course, by no means runtime
reconfigurations of the secure proxy should be allowed.
Finally, notice that malicious alterations of sensor signals
yi at network level, or within the sensor devices, is out of the
scope of this paper. On the other hand, our architecture de-
picted in Figure 2 ensures that the sensor measurements trans-
mitted to the supervisory control network (e.g., to SCADA
devices) will not be corrupted by the controller.
Contribution: Fist of all, we introduce a formal language
to specify controller programs. For this very purpose, we
resort to process calculi, a successful and widespread formal
approach in concurrency theory for representing complex
systems, such as IoT systems [18] and cyber-physical sys-
tems [19], and used in many areas, including verification of
security protocols [20], [21] and security analysis of cyber-
physical attacks [22].
We define a simple timed process calculus, based on Hen-
nessy and Regan’s Timed Process Language (TPL) [23], for
specifying controllers, edit automata, and networks of commu-
nicating monitored controllers. The proposed edit automata
are finite-state and equipped with an ad-hoc semantics for
mitigation, supporting the capability of emitting correct actions
in full autonomy in case the controller is not able to do so.
Then, we define a simple description language to express
timed correctness properties that should hold upon completion
of a finite number of scan cycles of the monitored controller.
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This will allow us to abstract over controllers implementations,
focusing on general properties which may even be shared by
completely different controllers. In this regard, we might resort
to one of the several logics existing in the literature for
monitoring timed concurrent systems, and in particular cyber-
physical systems (see, i.e., Bartocci et al. [24]). Actually,
since our formal language is based on Hennessy and Regan’s
TPL, one might think of using some sort of Hennessy-Milner
Logic [25], as in Aceto el al. [26]. However, the peculiar
iterative behaviour of controllers convinced us to adopt a
simple but expressive sub-class of regular expressions, the
only properties that under precise conditions can be enforced
by finite-state edit automata (see Beauquier et al.’s work [27])1.
Our regular properties allow us to express interesting correct-
ness properties, spanning over consecutive scan cycles, such
as: (i) timed forward causality, e.g., if some sensor signals
are detected then some actions will occur at some point
in the future (communications and/or actuations); (ii) timed
backward causality, e.g., if some actuations occur then some
signals have been previously detected in the past; (iii) timed
mutual exclusion, e.g., certain events may only occur in mutual
exclusion within a certain time interval.
After defining a formal language to describe controller
properties, we provide a synthesis function 〈|−|〉 that, given
an alphabet P of observable actions (sensor readings, actuator
commands, and inter-controller communications) and a deter-
ministic regular property e combining events of P , returns,
in polynomial time, a syntactically deterministic [28] edit
automaton 〈|e|〉P. The resulting enforcement mechanism will
ensure the required features mentioned before: observation-
based monitoring, transparency, soundness, deadlock-freedom,
divergence-freedom, mitigation and scalability.
Notice that, since our enforcement mechanism will be ob-
servation-based, i.e., it will observe only observable actions
in P , the monitor does not need updates when the enforced
controller is reinstalled with an obfuscated variant of its code2
which preserves the observable semantics of the controller.
Last but not least, the same monitor 〈|e|〉P can be used
to enforce different controllers sharing the same observable
actions P and complying with the same enforcing property e.
Outline: Section II contains our formal language to ex-
press monitored controllers. Section III provides a non-trivial
use case in the context of industrial water treatment systems.
Section IV provides a description language for a sub-class of
regular properties to express controller behaviours. Section V
contains an algorithm to synthesise monitors from regular
properties, and the main results of our enforcement. Section VI
draws conclusions and discusses related and future work.
Technical proofs can be found in the appendix.
II. A FORMAL LANGUAGE FOR MONITORED CONTROLLERS
In this section, we introduce our Timed Calculus of Moni-
tored Controllers, called TCMC, as an extension of Hennessy
1Regular properties have also been used by McLaughlin [10] to express the
security policies for PLCs in his enforcing monitor C2.
2This is usually what engineers do when a PLC appears to be compromised.
and Regan’s Timed Process Language (TPL) [23], to express
networks of controllers integrated with edit automata sitting
on the network interface of each controller to monitor/correct
their interactions with the rest of the system. Like TPL we
adopt a discrete notion of time: time proceeds in time slots
separated by tick-actions.
Let us start with some preliminary notation. We use s, sk ∈
Sens to name sensor signals; a, ak ∈ Act to indicate actuator
commands; c, ck ∈ Chn for channels; z1, zk for generic names.
Controller: In our setting, controllers are nondetermin-
istic sequential timed processes evolving through three main
phases: sensing of sensor signals, communication with other
controllers, and actuation. For convenience, we use five differ-
ent syntactic categories to distinguish the five main states of a
controller:   for initial states,  for sleeping states,
	 for sensing states,  
 for communication states, and
 for actuation states. In its initial state, a controller is a
recursive process waiting for signal stabilisation in order to
start the sensing phase:
   P ::= X
  W ::= tick.W ∣∣ S
The main process describing a controller consists of some
recursive process defined via equations of the form X =
tick.W , with W ∈ ; here, X is a process variable
that may occur (free) in W . For convenience, our controllers
always have at least one initial timed action tick to ensure time-
guarded recursion, thus avoiding undesired zeno behaviours:
each recursive call requires at least one time unit. Then, after
a determined sleeping period, when sensor signals get stable,
the sensing phase can start.
During the sensing phase, the controller waits for a finite
number of admissible sensor signals. If none of those signals
arrives in the current time slot then the controller will timeout
moving to the following time slot (we adopt the TPL construct
·· for timeout). The syntax is the following:




i∈I si.Si denotes the standard construct for nonde-
terministic choice. Once the sensing phase is concluded, the
controller starts its calculations that may depend on commu-
nications with other controllers governing different physical
processes. Controllers communicate with each other for mainly
two reasons: either to receive notice about the state of other
physical sub-processes or to require an actuation on a physical
process which is out of their control. We adopt a channel-
based handshake point-to-point communication paradigm as
in TPL. Notice that, in order to avoid starvation, the com-
munication is always under timeout. The syntax for the
communication phase is:
 
  C ::= ∑i∈I ci.CiC
∣∣ c.CC ∣∣ A
In the actuation phase a controller eventually transmits a
finite sequence of commands to actuators, and then, it emits a
fictitious control signal end to denote the end of the scan cycle.
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LABELLED TRANSITION SYSTEM FOR CONTROLLERS.
After that, the whole scan cycle can restart. Formally,
   A ::= a.A ∣∣ end.X
Remark 1 (Scan cycle duration and maximum cycle limit):
As expected, the signal end must occur well before the max-
imum cycle limit of the controller. We actually work under
the assumption that our controllers successfully complete their
scan cycle in less than half of the maximum cycle limit. The
reasons for this assumption will be clarified in Remark 2.
The operational semantics in Table I is along the lines of
Hennessy and Regan’s TPL [23].
In the following, we use the metavariable α to range over
the set of all observable actions: {s, a, c, c, tick, end}. These
actions denote: sensor readings, actuator commands, channel
transmissions, channel receptions, passage of time, and end of
scan cycles, respectively.
Monitored controller(s): The core of our runtime enforce-
ment relies on a (timed) sub-class of finite-state Ligatti et
al.’s edit automata [13], i.e., a particular class of automata
specifically designed to modify/suppress/insert actions in a
generic system in order to preserve its correct behaviour. The
syntax follows:
   E ::= go ∣∣ ∑i∈I αi/βi.Ei
∣
∣ X
The special automaton go will admit any action of the
monitored system, while the edit automaton
∑
i∈I αi/βi.Ei
replaces actions αi with βi, and then continues as Ei, for any
i ∈ I , with I finite; here, the metavariables βi range over the
same set of actions seen above for α together with the non-
observable action τ . Finally, recursive automata X are defined
via equations of the form X = E, where the automata variable
X may occur (free) in E. The operational semantics of our edit















Our monitored controllers, written E  {J}, consist of a
controller J , for J ∈  ∪ 	 ∪ 
 ∪  ∪
 , and an edit automaton E enforcing the behaviour of J ,
according to the two following transition rules:
(Enforce)
J
α−−→ J ′ E
α/β−−−→ E′
E{J} β−−→ E′ {J ′}
(Mitigation)
J
end−−−→ J ′ E
α/α−−−−→ E′ α∈ Sens∪ Chn∗ ∪ Act∪{tick}
E{J} α−−→ E′ {J}
The rule (Enforce), inspired by [26], can be used for enforc-
ing suppressions (when β = τ ) or corrections (when β 	= τ ) of
observable actions α emitted by the controller under scrutiny
(we focus on observation-based monitoring).
Thus, in a monitored controller E  {J} in which the
controller J works correctly, the enforcement never occurs
(i.e., when applying rule (Enforce) we always have α = β),
and the two components E and J evolve in a tethered fashion,
moving through related correct states.
On the other hand, if J is corrupted (for instance, due to
the presence of a malware) then E and J may get misaligned
within some scan cycle as reaching unrelated states. In this
case, the remaining actions emitted by the controller will be
suppressed by the monitor until the controller reaches the end
of the scan cycle, signalled by the emission of the end-action3.
Once the compromised controller has been driven to the end of
its scan cycle, the transition rule (Mitigation) goes into action.
The rule (Mitigation) allows the insertion of a sequence
of activities driven by the edit automaton in full autonomy.
Intuitively, if the compromised controller signals the end of
the scan cycle by emitting the action end and, at the same
time, the current edit automaton E is not in the same state,
then E will command the execution of a safe trace, without
any involvement of the (user program of the) controller, to
reach the end of the controller cycle. When both the controller
and the edit automaton will be aligned (at the end of the
3In general, malware that aims to take control of the plant has no interest in
delaying the scan cycle and risking the violation of the maximum cycle limit
whose consequence would be the immediate controller shutting down [7].
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off1, off2, close
l2, h2 l3, h3on3
off3
open req, close req
Fig. 3. A simplified Industrial Water Treatment System.
scan cycle) they will synchronise on the action end, via an
application of the transition rule (Enforce), and from then on
they will continue in a tethered fashion.
Remark 2: The assumption made in Remark 1 ensures us
enough time to complete the mitigation of the scan cycle, well
before the violation of the maximum cycle limit.
Obviously, we can easily generalise the concept of moni-
tored controller to a field communications network of parallel
monitored controllers, each one acting on different actuators,
and exchanging information via channels. These networks are
formally defined via a straightforward grammar:
   N ::= E{J} ∣∣ N ‖ N








N1 ‖ N2 α−−→ N1 ‖ N ′2
(ChnSync)
N1
c−−→ N ′1 N2 c−−→ N ′2
N1 ‖ N2 τ−−→ N ′1 ‖ N ′2
N2 ‖ N1 τ−−→ N ′2 ‖ N ′1
(TimeSync)
N1
tick−−−→ N ′1 N2 tick−−−→ N ′2 N1 ‖ N2 τ−−→
N1 ‖ N2 tick−−−→ N ′1 ‖ N ′2
Notice that monitored controllers may interact with each
other via channel communication (see Rule (ChnSync)). More-
over, via rule (TimeSync) they may evolve in time only when
channel synchronisation may not occur (our controllers do not
admit zeno behaviours). This ensures maximal progress [23],
a desirable time property when modelling real-time systems:
channel communications will never be postponed.
Having defined the possible actions β of a monitored field
network (we recall that β may also range over τ -actions, due
to an application of rule (Enforce)), we can easily concatenate
actions to define execution traces.
Definition 1 (Execution traces): Given a finite execution
trace t = β1 . . . βk, we write N
t−−→ N ′ as an abbreviation
for N = N0
β1−−−→ N1 β2−−−→ · · ·
βk−1−−−−−→ Nk−1 βk−−−→ Nk = N ′.
In the rest of the paper we adopt the following notations.
Notation 1: As usual, we write ε to denote the empty trace.
Given a trace t we write | t | to denote the length of t, i.e.,
the number of actions occurring in t. Given a trace t we write
t̂ to denote the trace obtained by removing the τ -actions from
t. Given two traces t′ and t′′, we write t′ · t′′ for the trace
resulting from the concatenation of t′ and t′′. For t = t′ · t′′
we say that t′ is a prefix of t and t′′ is a suffix of t.
III. USE CASE: THE SWAT SYSTEM
In this section, we describe how to specify in TCMC a non-
trivial network of PLCs to control (a simplified version of) the
Secure Water Treatment system (SWaT) [29].
SWaT represents a scaled down version of a real-world
industrial water treatment plant. The system consists of 6
stages, each of which deals with a different treatment, in-
cluding: chemical dosing, filtration, dechlorination, and reverse
osmosis. For simplicity, in our use case, depicted in Figure 3,
we consider only three stages. In the first stage, raw water is
chemically dosed and pumped in a tank T1, via two pumps
pump1 and pump2. A valve connects T1 with a filtration unit
that releases the treated water in a second tank T2. Here, we
assume that the flow of the incoming water in T1 is greater
than the outgoing flow passing through the valve. The water
in T2 flows into a reverse osmosis unit to reduce inorganic
impurities. In the last stage, the water coming from the reverse
osmosis unit is either distributed as clean water, if required
standards are met, or stored in a backwash tank T3 and then
pumped back, via a pump pump3, to the filtration unit. Here,
we assume that tank T2 is large enough to receive the whole
content of tank T3 at any moment.
The SWaT system has been used to provide a dataset
containing physical and network data recorded during 11 days
of activity [30]. Part of this dataset contains information about
the execution of the system in isolation, while a second part
records the effects on the system when exposed to different
kinds of cyber-physical attacks. Thus, for instance, (i) drops
of commands to activate pump2 may affect the quality of
the water, as they would affect the correct functioning of the
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chemical dosing pump; (ii) injections of commands to close
the valve between T1 and T2, may give rise to an overflow of
tank T1 if this tank is full; (iii) integrity attacks on the signals
coming from the sensor of the tank T3 may result in damages
of the pump pump3 if it is activated when T3 is empty.
Each tank has its own PLC, possibly connected with the
others via dedicated communication channels. In the rest of
the section, we propose a possible implementation of the three
PLCs governing the three tanks.
Let us start with the code P1 of the controller PLC1
managing the tank T1. Its definition in TCMC is the following:
P1 = tick.
(l1.close req.on1.on2.close.end.P1(on1.on2.open.end.P1)
+m1.open req.open.end.P1 + close req.close.end.P1(end.P1)
+h1.close req.off1.off2.close.end.P1(off1.off2.open.end.P1)(end.P1)
)
PLC1 waits for one time slot (to get stable sensor signals)
and then checks the water level of the tank T1, distinguishing
between three possible states. If T1 reaches a low level (signal
l1) then the PLC listens for requests at channel close req to
close the valve between T1 and T2, arriving from PLC2 (the
controller of tank T2). If PLC1 gets such a request then it
turns both pumps on (commands on1 and on2), closes the valve
(command close), and then returns; otherwise, it times out, turns
both pumps on, opens the valve (command open), and then
returns. If the level of the tank is high (signal h1) then PLC1
listens for requests arriving at channel close req from PLC2. If a
request arrives then the PLC turns both pumps off (commands
off1 and off2), it closes the valve, and then returns; otherwise
it times out, turns both pumps off, opens the valve, and then
returns. Finally, if the tank T1 is at some intermediate level
between l1 and h1 (signal m1) then PLC1 listens for requests
from PLC2 of opening the valve; if PCL1 gets an open req
request then it opens the valve, letting the water flow from T1
to T2, and returns; otherwise, if it gets a close req request then
it closes the valve, and then returns.
PLC2 manages the water level of tank T2. Its code P2 is
defined in TCMC via the following equation:
P2 = tick.(l2.open req.end.P2end.P2
+h2.close req.end.P2end.P2end.P2)
Here, after one time slot, the level of T2 is checked. If the
level is low (signal l2) then PLC2 sends a request to PLC1,
via the channel open req, to open the valve letting the water to
flow from T1 to T2, and then returns. Otherwise, if the level
of tank T2 is high (signal h2) then PLC2 asks PLC1 to close
the valve, via the channel close req, and then returns.
Finally, PLC3 manages the water level of tank T3. Its code
P3 is defined in TCMC via the following equation:
P3 = tick.(l3.off3.end.P3 + h3.on3.end.P3end.P3)
Here, after one time slot, the level of the backwash tank T3
is checked. If the level is low (signal l3) then PLC3 turns off
the pump pump3 (command off3), and then returns. Otherwise,
if the level of T3 is high (signal h3) then the pump is turned on
(command on3) and the whole content of T3 is pumped back
into the filtration unit of T2; after that the PLC returns.
IV. A FORMAL LANGUAGE FOR CONTROLLER PROPERTIES
In this section, we provide a simple description language to
express correctness properties that we may wish to enforce at
runtime in our controllers. As discussed in the Introduction,
we resort to (a sub-class of) regular properties, the logical
counterpart of regular expressions, as they allow us to express
interesting classes of properties referring to one or more scan
cycles of a controller. The proposed language distinguishes
between two kinds of properties: (i) global properties, e ∈
 , to express general controllers’ execution traces; (ii)
local properties, p ∈  , to express traces confined to a
finite number of consecutive scan cycles. The two families of
properties are formalised via the following regular grammar:
e ∈   ::= p∗
p ∈   ::= ε | p1; p2 | ∪i∈Iπi.pi
where πi ∈ Sens ∪ Act ∪ Chn∗ ∪ {tick} ∪ {end} denote atomic
properties, sometimes called events, that may occur as prefix
of a property. With an abuse of notation, we use the symbol
ε to denote both the empty property and the empty trace.
The semantics of our logic is naturally defined in terms
of sets of execution traces which satisfy a given property; its
formal definition is given in Table II.
However, the syntax of our logic is a bit too permissive with
respect to our intentions, as it allows us to describe partial scan
cycles, i.e., cycles that have not completed. Thus, we restrict
ourselves to considering properties which builds on top of local
properties associated to complete scan cycles, i.e., scan cycles
whose last action is an end-action. Formally,
Definition 2: Well-formed properties are defined as follows:
• the local property end.ε is well formed;
• a local property of the form p1; p2 is well formed if p2
is well formed;
• a local property of the form ∪i∈Iπi.pi is well formed if,
for any j ∈ I either πj .pj = end.ε or, pj is well formed.
A global property p∗ is well-formed if p is well-formed.
In the rest of the paper, we adopt the following notations.
Notation 2: We omit trailing empty properties, writing π
instead of π.ε. For k > 0, we write πk.p as a shorthand for
π.π...π.p, where prefix π appears k consecutive times. Given a
local property p we write events(p) to denote the set of events
occurring in p; for a global property e = p∗, events(e) is given
by events(p). Given a set of events A and a local property p,
we use A itself as an abbreviation for the property ∪π∈Aπ.ε,
and A.p as an abbreviation for the property ∪π∈Aπ.p. Given
a set of events A, with end 	∈ A, we write A≤k, for k ≥ 0, to
denote the property defined as follows:
• A≤0  end
• A≤k  end ∪ A.A≤k−1, for k > 0.
Thus, the property A≤k captures all possible sequences of
events of A whose length is at most k, for k ∈ N.
A. Some significant correctness properties
In this section, we describe three different classes of correct-
ness properties, expressible in our language, which are suitable
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TRACE SEMANTICS OF OUR REGULAR PROPERTIES.
to describe significant controller properties spanning over a
finite number of scan-cycles: timed forward causality, timed
backward causality and timed mutual exclusion.
In order to properly define these three classes of properties,
we introduce four predicates relating events, properties and
time (i.e., scan cycles). Thus, given an event π, a local property
p and a natural number n, we write π pfx∀n p (resp., π sfx
∀
n p)




the action π (associated to the
event π) must appear in some prefix (resp., suffix) of t, within
at most n scan cycles. As the end of a scan cycle is always
represented via the action end, this means that in all traces in
p

the action π is always preceded (resp., followed) by at
most n− 1 end-actions. Formally,
Definition 3: Let p ∈   be a well-formed local
property, π be an event, and n ∈ N be a natural number.
The predicate π pfx∀n p (resp., π sfx
∀
n p) returns true only if
for any t ∈ p there exists a trace t′ · end, which is a prefix
(resp., suffix) of t, such that the action π occurs in t′ and the
action end occurs in t′ at most n− 1 times.
Similarly, given an event π, a local property p and a natural
number n we write π pfx∃n p (resp., π sfx
∃
n p) to prescribe
that the action π (associated to the event π) must appear in





at most n scan cycles. Formally,
Definition 4: Let p ∈   be a well-formed local
property, π be an event, and n ∈ N be a natural number.
The predicate π pfx∃n p (resp., π sfx
∃
n p) returns true only if
there is a trace t ∈ p and a trace t′ · end, which is a prefix
(resp., suffix) of t, such that the action π occurs in t′ and the
action end occurs in t′ at most n− 1 times.
Now, everything is in place to define our classes of proper-
ties. In what follows, the variables π1, π2 and πi, for i ∈ I , will
range over untimed events, i.e., π1, π2, πi ∈ Sens∪Act∪Chn∗.
Timed forward causality: In this class we collect proper-
ties expressing the causality between a triggering event π1 and
a second event π2 that will occur at some point in the future.
For instance, if an event π1 occurs (e.g., a sensor signal) then a
subsequent event π2 (e.g., some communication or actuation)
will occur in the future, for the first time, within a specific time
interval, e.g., after m scan cycles and before n scan cycles,
with 0 ≤ m ≤ n ∈ N. For simplicity, we do not allow nesting
between causes and effects, i.e., once a triggering event π1
has occurred it may occur again only after an occurrence of
the event π2.
4 Thus, we write π1 entails [m,n] π2 to denote a
4This is a reasonable requirement in cyber-physical systems, where physical
processes are sensed only after some proper actuation has been completed.
class of properties of the form (p; (q∪π1.r))∗ ∈  , for
p, q, r ∈   such that:
• the event π1 does not occur neither in p nor in q (this
because if the event π1 does not occur at all then the
whole property is trivially satisfied);
• the event π1 does not occur in r (we do not allow nested
causality);
• for m > 0 it holds that ¬(π2 pfx∃m−1 r), i.e., if the event
π1 occurs then π2 never occurs in the following m − 1
scan cycles captured by r (including the current one);
• π2 pfx∀n r, i.e., if the event π1 occurs then the event π2
must always occur within at most n scan cycles captured
by r (including the current scan cycle).
As an example, we might enforce a timed forward property
in PLC1 of our use case to prevent water overflow in the tank
T2, due to a misuse of the valve connecting the tanks T1 and
T2. Assuming that z ∈ N is the time (expressed in scan cycles)
required to overflow the tank T2, we might consider to enforce
a timed forward property of the form:
open req entails [0,w] close
with w << z, saying that if the PLC receives a request to open
the valve (i.e., the event open req occurs) then the valve will be
eventually closed (the event close will eventually occur) within
at most w scan cycles (including the current one). This ensures
us that the valve will remain open at most w scan cycles, with
w << z, preventing the overflow of T2. As the scan cycle of
PLC1 is at most 6 actions long, a possible implementation of
this property is the following:(
tick.A; (A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4)
)∗
,
with A = {l1,m1, h1}∪{on1, on2, off1, off2, open, close}∪{close req}∪{tick}
being the set of all possible actions of PLC1 except for open req
and end, while Bkh is the set of all admitted actions in the
following k scan cycles, where h counts intra-scan-cycles
actions. Formally,
• Bkh  close.A≤h−1∪ (A\{close}).Bkh−1∪ end.tick.Bk−16 , for
k > 1, and h > 0;
• Bk0  end.tick.Bk−16 , for k > 1; B10  close.end.
Timed backward causality: In this class we collect prop-
erties that express the causality between a triggering event π1
and a second event π2 that occurred back in the past. For
instance, if an event π1 occurs (e.g., an actuator command)
then an event π2 (e.g., either some sensor signal or some
communication) must have occurred in the past at least m scan
cycles earlier but no more than n scan cycles earlier. Again,
for simplicity we do not consider nesting between causes π1
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〈|p∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| p |〉PX
〈| ε |〉PX  X
〈| p1; p2 |〉PX  〈| p1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p2 |〉PX , Z fresh
〈| ⋃i∈I πi.pi |〉PX  Z, for Z =
∑
i∈I πi/πi.〈| pi |〉PX +
∑
α∈P\(∪i∈Iπi∪{tick,end})
α/τ .Z, Z fresh
TABLE III
MONITOR SYNTHESIS FROM OUR REGULAR PROPERTIES.
and effects π2. Thus, we write π1 requires [m,n] π2 to denote a
class of properties of the form (s; (p∪(q;π1.r)))∗ ∈  ,
for p, q, r, s ∈  , such that:
• π1 does not occur neither in s nor in p (if π1 does not
occur at all then the property is trivially satisfied);
• for m > 0 it holds that ¬(π2 sfx∃m−1 q), i.e., if the event
π1 occurs then the event π2 never occurred in the previous
m− 1 scan cycles captured by q;
• π2 sfx∀n q, i.e., if the event π1 occurs then π2 must have
occurred in the past, at most n scan cycles earlier.
As an example, we might enforce a timed backward property
in PLC3 of our use case to prevent damages in the pump
pump3 due to lack of water in the tank T3. Thus, we might
consider to enforce a property of the form:
on3 requires [0,0] h3
saying that if the pump3 is on then the level of the tank T3
must have been (previously) sensed as high in the current scan
cycle, preventing pump damages. As the scan cycle of PLC3
is at most 2 actions long, a possible implementation of this
property is:
(tick; (l3.A≤1 ∪ h3; on3.end))∗
where A = {l3, h3} ∪ {off3} ∪ {tick} is the set of all possible
actions of PLC3 except for on3 and end.
Timed mutual exclusion: In this class we collect proper-
ties denoting that certain events πi, for i ∈ I , may occur only
in mutual exclusion within n consecutive scan cycles.
Thus, we write mutual exclusion [n]A, with n ≥ 0 and
A = ∪i∈Iπi to denote a class of properties of the form:(
p; (q∪(∪i∈Iπi.ri))
)∗∈  , for p, q, ri∈ , where:
• for all i ∈ I the event πi does not occur neither in p
nor in q (if πi does not occur at all then the property is
trivially satisfied);
• for all i ∈ I the event πi does not occur in ri (we do not
consider nesting of properties);
• for all i ∈ I , all traces in ri

are n scan cycles long,
i.e., they contain n occurrences of the end action;
• ¬(πi pfx∃n πj .rj), for all i, j ∈ I , with i 	= j (the events
πi are in mutual exclusion for n consecutive scan cycles).
As an example, we might enforce a timed mutual exclusion
property in the PLC2 of our use case to prevent chattering
of the valve, i.e., rapid opening and closing which may cause
mechanical failures on the long run. Thus, we might consider
to enforce a property of the form:
mutual exclusion [3]{open req, close req}
saying that the events to request the opening and the closing of
the valve (events open req and close req, respectively) may only
occur in mutual exclusion within 3 consecutive scan cycles.
As the scan cycle of PLC2 has at most 2 actions, a possible
implementation of the property is the following:
(tick.A; (open req.end.B2 ∪ close req.end.B2))∗
where A={l2, h2} ∪ {tick} is the set of all possible actions of
PLC2 except for open req, close req, and end, while Bk is the set of
all admitted actions in the following k scan cycles. Formally,
Bk  tick.A≤2;Bk−1, for k > 0, and B0  ε.
V. MONITOR SYNTHESIS
In this section, we provide an algorithm to synthesise moni-
tors from regular properties of the kind defined in the previous
section. In particular, given (i) a set P of observable actions
(i.e., different from τ -actions), and (ii) a global property
e ∈   whose events are contained in (the set of events
associated to) P , the synthesis returns an edit automaton that
is capable to enforce (the preservation of) the property e
during the execution of a generic controller whose actions are
contained in P . As we distinguish global properties from local
ones, we define our synthesis algorithm in two steps.
The synthesis algorithm is defined in Table III by induction
on the structure of the property given in input. The monitor
〈|p∗|〉P associated to a global property p∗ and a set of actions
P , is an edit automaton defined via the recursive equation X =
〈| p |〉PX , to enforce the local property p during each scan cycle
via the edit automaton resulting from the synthesis 〈| p |〉PX ,
parametric in the automata variable X and the set of actions P .
The edit automaton 〈| p1; p2 |〉PX associated to the property
p1; p2 is given by the sequential composition of the corre-
sponding edit automata. The two automata are composed by
replacing in 〈|p1 |〉PZ the free edit variable Z, where Z 	= X,
with the continuation 〈| p2 |〉PX . Finally, the edit automaton
associated to a union property ∪i∈Iπi.pi permits all actions
associated to the events πi, and suppresses all the others.
Remark 3 (Synthesis vs. mitigation): Notice that our syn-
thesised enforcers never suppress tick-actions and end-actions.
In particular, end-actions are crucial watchdogs signalling the
end of a controller scan cycle: if the enforcer is in line with
the controller then a new scan cycle is free to start, otherwise,
if this is not the case, the enforcer launches a mitigation cycle
by yielding some correct trace, without any involvement of the
controller, to reach the completion of the current scan cycle.
Our synthesis algorithm allows us to define an enforcement
mechanism that ensures the features stated in the Introduc-
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〈| D≤k |〉PX  Dk, for Dk =
∑
α∈D








〈| ε |〉PX  X
TABLE IV
SYNTHESIS OF THE GENERIC PROPERTY D≤k , FOR k ≥ 0.
tion: observation-based monitoring, determinism preserva-
tion, feasibility, transparency, soundness, deadlock-freedom,
divergence-freedom, and scalability.
Let us formally prove these requirements. In the following,
with a small abuse of notation, given a set of actions P , we
will use P to denote also the set of the corresponding events.
Our enforcing monitoring is trivially observation-based as
our edit automata admit only correcting actions of the form
α/β, in which the metavariable α, by definition, cannot be the
non-observable action τ .
As concerns determinism preservation, we focus on Aceto
et al.’s syntactic notion of deterministic edit automata [28].
Definition 5: An edit automaton E is called syntactically
deterministic if for any sub-term
∑
i∈I αi/βi.Ei occurring in E
it holds that αk 	= αh, for k, h ∈ I and k 	= h.
Now, by inspection on the definition of 〈| ∪i∈Iπi.pi |〉PX our
synthesis algorithm does not introduce nondeterminism. The
proof of the following result is by induction on the structure
of the enforced property.
Proposition 1 (Determinism preservation): Given a global
property e ∈   and a set of actions P , the edit
automaton 〈|e|〉P is syntactically deterministic.
The complexity of the algorithm is polynomial on the size of
the set P and the dimension of the enforced property e; where,
intuitively, the dimension of e, written dim(e), is given by the
number of operators occurring in it.
Proposition 2 (Polynomial Complexity): Given a property
e ∈   and a set of actions P such that events(e) ⊆ P ,
the complexity of the algorithm to synthesise 〈|e|〉P is O(m·n),
with m = dim(e) and n being the size of the set P .
Let us move to the next required property: transparency. In-
tuitively, the enforcement induced by a property e ∈  
should not prevent those traces of the controller under scrutiny
satisfying the property e itself [13].
Theorem 1 (Transparency): Let e ∈   and P be a set
of observable actions such that events(e) ⊆ P . Let P ∈ 
be a controller whose actions are contained in P . Let t be a
trace of go{P}. If t ∈ e then t is a trace of 〈|e|〉P {P}.
Another important property of our enforcement is sound-
ness. Intuitively, a monitored controller yields only execution
traces which satisfy the enforced property.
Theorem 2 (Soundness): Let e ∈   be a well-formed
global property and P be a set of observable actions such that
events(e) ⊆ P . Let P ∈  be a controller whose actions
are contained in P . If t is a trace of the system 〈|e|〉P {P}




(for t̂, see Notation 1).
Here, it is important to stress that in general soundness does
not ensure deadlock-freedom of the monitored controller. That
is, it may be possible that the enforcement of some property
e causes a deadlock of the controller P under scrutiny. In
particular, this may happen in our controllers only when the
initial sleeping phase does not match the enforcing property.
Intuitively, a local property will be called a k-sleeping property
only if it allows k initial time instants of sleep.
Definition 6: For k ∈ N+, we say that p ∈  	 is a




= {t | t = t1 · ... ·
tn, for n > 0, s.t. ti = tick
k·t′i·end, end /∈ t′i, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
We say that p∗ is a k-sleeping global property only if p is.5
The enforcement of k-sleeping properties does not introduce
deadlocks in k-sleeping controllers.
Proposition 3 (Deadlock-freedom): Let e = p∗, for p ∈
 	, be a k-sleeping property, and P be a set of observable
actions such that events(e) ⊆ P . Let P ∈  be a controller
of the form P = tickk.S whose set of observable actions is
contained in P . Then, 〈|e|〉P {P} does not deadlock.
Another important property of our enforcement mechanism
is divergence-freedom. In practise, the enforcement does not
introduce divergence: monitored controllers will always be
able to complete their scan cycles by executing a finite number
of actions. This is because in our enforcing regular properties
e the number of events within two subsequent end events is
always finite.6
Proposition 4 (Divergence-freedom): Let e ∈   be
a well-formed global property and P be a set of observable
actions. Let P ∈  be a controller whose set of observable
actions is contained in P . Then, there exists a k ∈ N+ such
that whenever 〈|e|〉P  {P} t−−→ E  {J}, if E  {J} t
′
−−→
E′ {J ′}, with | t′ |≥ k, then end ∈ t′.
Finally, the soundness of our runtime enforcement scale to
field communications networks of controllers. Intuitively, the
soundness of a monitored controller is preserved when running
in parallel with other controllers in the same field communi-
cations network. By an application of Theorem 2 we have:
Corollary 1 (Scalability): Let e ∈   be a well-formed
global property and P be a set of observable actions such
that events(e) ⊆ P . Let N ∈ 
 be a field network and
P ∈  be a controller whose set of observable actions is
contained in P . If (〈|e|〉P {P}) ‖ N t−−→ (E{J}) ‖ N ′, for
some t, E, J and N ′, then whenever 〈|e|〉P {P} t
′
−−→ E{J}





As an example, we show an application of Corollary 1 to
the field network consisting of the three PLCs of our case
5It is easy to see that k-sleeping properties are always well-formed.
6Technically speaking, the edit automaton 〈|e|〉P may not diverge.
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tick.A; (A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4)
)∗
, the timed forward
causality property for PLC1, whose corresponding edit
automaton is synthesised in Table V;
• e2  (tick.A; (open req.end.B2∪ close req.end.B2))∗ the timed
mutual exclusion property for PLC2, whose correspond-
ing edit automaton is synthesised in Table VI;
• e3  (tick; (l3.A≤1 ∪ h3; on3.end))∗ the timed backward
causality property for the controller PLC3, whose corre-
sponding edit automaton is synthesised in Table VII.
The three syntheses above rely on the synthesis of general
properties of the form D≤k, for an arbitrary set of events D,
given in Table IV.





be an arbitrary trace of the whole monitored network. Then,
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, if 〈|ei|〉{PLCi} ti−−→ Ei {Ji} then t̂i





VI. CONCLUSIONS, RELATED AND FUTURE WORK
We have defined a formal language to express networks of
monitored controllers, potentially compromised with colluding
malware that may forge/drop actuator commands, modify sen-
sor readings, and forge/drop inter-controller communications.
The runtime enforcement has been achieved via a finite-
state sub-class of Ligatti’s edit automata equipped with an
ad-hoc operational semantics to deal with system mitigation,
by inserting actions in full autonomy when the monitored
controller is not able to do so in a correct manner.
Then, we have defined a simple description language to
express ad-hoc timed regular properties which have been used
to describe both causality and mutual exclusion of events
laying in intervals of time expressed in terms of scan cycles of
the monitored controller. Some sort of regular properties have
already been used by McLaughlin [10] to express security
policies for PLCs in his enforcing monitor C2.
Once defined a formal language to describe controller
properties, we have provided a synthesis function 〈|−|〉 that,
given an alphabet P of observable actions (sensor readings, ac-
tuator commands, and inter-controller communications) and a
deterministic regular property e, where the events in e are part
of the alphabet P , returns, in a time which is polynomial in the
sizes of P and e, a syntactically deterministic and observation-
based edit automaton 〈|e|〉P ; here observation-based means that
the monitoring acts only on those observable actions occurring
in P . The resulting enforcement mechanism will ensure the
required features advocated in the Introduction: transparency,
soundness, deadlock-freedom, divergence-freedom, mitigation
and scalability. In particular, with regards to mitigation, as
reported in Remark 3, our synthesised enforcers never suppress
end-actions as they are crucial watchdogs signalling the end of
a controller scan cycle: if the enforcer is aligned with the
controller then a new scan cycle is free to start, otherwise, if
this is not the case, the enforcer launches a mitigation cycle
by yielding some correct trace, without any involvement of the
controller, to reach the completion of the current scan cycle.
Notice that the same monitor 〈|e|〉P can be used to enforce
different controllers sharing the same observable actions P
and complying with the same enforcing property e (both the
controller and the property e must agree on the duration of
the initial sleeping phase). Furthermore, in the Introduction
we have carefully argued about the advantages of securing the
monitoring proxy rather than the controller itself.
Finally, an exemplification of our enforcement mechanism
has been provided by means of a non-trivial running example
in the context of industrial water treatment systems.
Related work: The notion of runtime enforcement was
introduced by Schneider [12] to enforce security policies.
These properties are enforced by means of security automata,
a kind of automata that terminates the monitored system in
case of violation of the property.
Ligatti et al. [13] extended Schneider’s work by proposing
the notion of edit automata, i.e., an enforcement mecha-
nism able of replacing, suppressing, or even inserting system
actions. In general, Ligatti et al.’s edit automata have an
enumerable number of states, whereas in the current paper we
restrict ourselves to finite-state edit automata. Furthermore, in
its original definition the insertion of actions is possible at
any moment, whereas our monitoring edit automata can insert
actions, via the rule (Mitigation), only when the controller under
scrutiny reaches a specific state, i.e., the end of the scan cycle.
We also use correcting actions of the form α/β, in the style of
Aceto et al. [26]. These actions can be easily expressed in the
original Ligatti’s formulation by inserting the action β first,
and then suppressing the action α.
Bielova [31] provided a stronger notion of enforceability
equipped with a predictability criterion to prevent monitors
from transforming invalid executions in an arbitrary manner.
Intuitively, a monitor is said predictable if one can predict the
number of transformations used to correct invalid executions,
thereby avoiding unnecessary transformations.
Falcone et al. [32], [14] proposed a synthesis algorithm,
relying on Street automata, to translate most of the property
classes defined within the Safety-Progress hierarchy [33] into
enforcers. In the Safety-Progress classification our global
properties can be seen as guarantee properties for which all
execution traces that satisfy a property contain at least one
prefix that still satisfies the property.
Beauquier et al. [27] proved that finite-state edit automata
(i.e. those edit automata we are actually interested in) can
only enforce a sub-class of regular properties. Actually they
can enforce all and only the regular properties that can be
recognised by a finite automata whose cycles always contain
at least one final state. This is the case of our enforced regular
properties, as well-formed local properties in   always
terminate with the “final” atomic property end.
Some interesting results on runtime enforcement of reactive
systems (which have many aspects in common with control
systems) have been presented by Könighofer et al. [34]. They
defined a synthesis algorithm that given a safety property
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〈|(tick.A; (A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4)
)∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| tick.A; (A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4) |〉PX
〈| tick.A; (A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4) |〉PX  〈| tick.A |〉PU , for U = 〈| A≤5 ∪ open req.Bz4 |〉PX




〈| A |〉PU  A, for A =
∑
α∈A









+ open req/open req.〈| Bz5 |〉PX
〈| Bkh |〉PX  Bkh, for Bkh = close/close.〈| (A\{close})≤h−1 |〉PX +
∑
α∈A\{close}
α/α.〈| Bkh−1 |〉PX + R




〈| tick.Bkh |〉PX  Y, for Y = tick/tick.〈| Bkh |〉PX +
∑
α∈P\{tick,end}
α/τ .〈| tick.Bkh |〉PX












〈| ε |〉PX  X
TABLE V
SYNTHESIS FROM THE TIMED FORWARD CAUSALITY PROPERTY e1 OF PLC1 ,
WHERE P = {l1,m1, h1} ∪ {on1, on2, off1, off2, open, close} ∪ {close req, open req} ∪ {tick, end}, AND A =
{l1,m1, h1} ∪ {on1, on2, off1, off2, open, close} ∪ {close req} ∪ {tick}, FOR k ∈ {2, 3, 4}, AND h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}.
〈|(tick.A; (open req.end.B2 ∪ close req.end.B2))∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| tick.A; (open req.end.B2 ∪ close req.end.B2) |〉PX
〈| tick.A; (open req.end.B2 ∪ close req.end.B2) |〉PX  〈| tick.A |〉PU , for U = 〈| open req.end.B2 ∪ close req.end.B2 |〉PX




〈| A |〉PU  A, for A =
∑
α∈A

















〈| B0 |〉PX  B0, for B0 = 〈| ε |〉PX
〈| A≤2;Bk−1 |〉PX  〈| A≤2 |〉PY , for Y = 〈| Bk−1 |〉PX




〈| ε |〉PX  X
TABLE VI
SYNTHESIS FROM THE TIMED BACKWARD CAUSALITY PROPERTY e2 OF PLC2 ,
WHERE P = {l2, h2} ∪ {open req, close req} ∪ {tick, end}, AND A = {l2, h2} ∪ {tick}, k ∈ {1, 2}.
〈|(tick.ε; (l3.A≤1 ∪ h3.ε; on3.end.ε))∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| tick.ε; (l3.A≤1 ∪ h3.ε; on3.end.ε)) |〉PX
〈| tick.ε; (l3.A≤1 ∪ h3.ε; on3.end.ε) |〉PX  〈| tick.ε |〉PU , for U = 〈| l3.A≤1 ∪ h3.ε; on3.end.ε |〉PX








〈| ε; on3.end.ε |〉PX  〈| ε |〉PR for R = 〈| on3.end.ε |〉PX








〈| ε |〉PX  X
TABLE VII
SYNTHESIS FROM THE TIMED BACKWARD CAUSALITY PROPERTY e3 OF PLC3 ,
WHERE P = {l3, h3} ∪ {on3, off3} ∪ {tick, end}, AND A = {l3, h3} ∪ {off3} ∪ {tick}.
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returns a monitor, called shield, that analyses both inputs
and outputs of a reactive system, and enforces the desired
property by correcting the minimum number of output actions.
More recently, Pinisetty et al. [35] proposed a bi-directional
runtime enforcement mechanism for reactive systems, and
more generally for cyber-physical systems, to correct both
inputs and outputs. They express the desired properties in
terms of Discrete Timed Automata (DTA) whose labels are
system actions. Thus, an execution trace satisfies a required
property only if it ends up on a final state of the corresponding
DTA. Although the authors do not identify specific classes of
correctness properties as we aim to do, DTAs are obviously
more expressive than our class of regular properties. However,
as not all regular properties can be enforced [27], they pro-
posed a more permissive enforcement mechanism that accepts
also execution traces which may reach a final state.
Finally, Aceto et al. [26] developed an operational frame-
work to enforce properties in HML logic with recursion
(μHML) relying on suppression only. They also enforced the
safety of the syntactic fragment of the logic by providing
an automated synthesis algorithm that generates correct sup-
pression monitors from formulas. Enforceability of modal μ-
calculus (a reformulation of μHML) was previously tackled
by Martinelli and Matteucci [36].
As regards papers in the context of control system se-
curity closer to our objectives, McLaughlin [10] proposed
the introduction of an enforcement mechanism, called C2,
similar to our secure proxy, to mediate the control signals
uk transmitted by the PLC to the plant. Thus, like our secured
proxy, C2 is able to suppress commands, but unlike our proxy,
it cannot autonomously send commands to the physical devices
in the absence of a timely correct action from the PLC.
Furthermore, C2 does not seem to cope with inter-controller
communications, and hence with colluding malware operating
on PLCs of the same field network.
Mohan et al. [11] proposed a different approach by defining
an ad-hoc security architecture, called Secure System Simplex
Architecture (S3A), with the intention to generalise the notion
of “correct system state” to include not just the physical state
of the plant but also the cyber state of the PLCs of the system.
In S3A, every PLC runs under the scrutiny of a side-channel
monitor which looks for deviations with respect to safe execu-
tions, taking care of real-time constraints, memory usage, and
communication patterns. If the information obtained via the
monitor differs from the expected model(s) of the PLC, a de-
cision module is informed to decide whether to pass the control
from the “potentially compromised” PLC to a safety controller
to maintain the plant within the required safety margins. As
reported by the same authors, S3A has a number of limitations
comprising: (i) the possible compromising of the side channels
used for monitoring, (ii) the tuning of the timing parameters
of the state machine, which is still a manual process.
Future work: We are currently working on the simulation
of secure proxies, based on our enforcement mechanism, to
monitor PLCs whose code is written in the structured text
programming language, which is general enough to represent
the other four languages for PLCs [37]. To this end, we
have implemented in Python a synthesis algorithm that returns
enforcers written in Verilog [38], an hardware description
language used to model electronic systems. We are testing
a number of case studies in a co-simulated environment, i.e.,
an integration of two simulation environments built on top of
Simulink [39] and ModelSim [40], where Simulink is used to
run the system under scrutiny, while ModelSim simulates the
runtime behaviour of the enforcer written in Verilog.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs of Section V
In order to prove the polynomial complexity of the synthesis
algorithm, we provide a formal definition of size of both global
and local properties. Intuitively, the size of a property is given
by the number of operators occurring in it.
Definition 7: Let dim() :   ∪   →  be our
property-size function, defined as follows:
dim(p∗)  1 + dim(p)
dim(ε)  1
dim(p1; p2)  dim(p1) + dim(p2) + 1
dim(
⋃
i∈I αi.pi)  | I | +
∑
i∈I dim(pi).
Let us prove Proposition 2 (Polynomial complexity).
Proof: Let e = p∗, for some p ∈  . We prove that
the recursive structure of the function returning 〈|p∗|〉P can be
characterised in the following form: T (m) = T (m − 1) + n,
with m = dim(p) and n being the size of the set P . The result
follows because T (m) = T (m− 1) + n is O(m · n).
As 〈|p∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| p |〉PX , the proof is by case analy-
sis on the structure of the local property p, by examining each
synthesis step in which the synthesis function is processing
m = dim(p) symbols. In what follows we identify: (i) how
many symbols of p the synthesis functions processes, (ii) how
many times the synthesis function calls itself, and (iii) how
many computations performs in that step.
– Let p ≡ ε. As dim(ε) = 1, it follows that T (1) = 1.
– Let p ≡ p1; p2. Let m = dim(p1; p2). By definition, the
synthesis 〈|p1; p2|〉P does not consume any symbol and calls
itself on p1 and p2 with m1 and m2 symbols, respectively,
with m1 + m2 = m − 1. Thus, we can characterise the
recursive structure as: T (m) = T (m1) + T (m2). Notice that
the complexity of this recursive form is smaller than the
complexity of T (m− 1) + n.
– Let p ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.pi. Let m = dim(⋃i∈I πi.pi). By
definition, the synthesis 〈|⋃i∈I πi.pi|〉P consumes all events
πi, for i ∈ I . The synthesis algorithm re-calls itself | I |
times on pi, with dim(pi) symbols, for i ∈ I . Further-
more, the algorithm performs at most n operations due to a
summation over over α ∈ P \ (⋃i∈I πi ∪ {tick, end}), with
|P \ (⋃i∈I πi∪{tick, end}) |< n. Thus, we can characterise the
recursive structure as T (m) =
∑
i∈I T (dim(pi)) + n. Since∑
i∈I dim(pi) = m−| I | ≤ m− 1, the complexity is smaller
than that of T (m− 1) + n.
Let us prove Theorem 1 (Transparency).
Proof: We prove a more general result. Let e = p∗ for
p ∈   and P ∈ 	
. We prove that for any trace t of
go{P}, if t is a prefix of some trace in p∗ then:
1) 〈|p∗|〉P {P} t−−→ E{J}, where either E = 〈| p′ |〉PX or
E = Z, with Z = 〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-term
of p, and for some automaton variable X and controller J ;
2) there is a trace t′ such that t′ ∈ p′ and t · t′ is a prefix





We proceed by induction on the length n of the trace t.
Base case. Let n = 1. Let t = β ∈ Sens ∪ Chn∗ ∪ Act ∪





. By definition, β ∈ events(p∗) ⊆ P .
We now analyse the possible actions of the edit automaton
〈|p∗|〉P . By definition, 〈|p∗|〉P  X, for X = 〈| p |〉PX . We
proceed by case analysis on the structure of p:
– Let p ≡ ε. This case is not admissible as p would not be
well-formed.
– Let p ≡ p1; p2. By definition, the synthesis returns
〈| p1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p2 |〉PX , and Z 	= X. Now, if p1 	= ε
then in order to analyse the transitions afforded by 〈| p1 |〉PZ
we resort to one of the other two cases. Similarly, if p1 = ε
then 〈| p1 |〉PZ = Z, with Z = 〈| p2 |〉PX , and for the analysis of
〈| p2 |〉PX we resort to one of the other cases.
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– Let p ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.pi. By definition, the synthesis algorithm








Thus, the possible transitions of 〈| p |〉PX are:
• 〈| p |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−−→ 〈| pi |〉PX , for πi ∈ events(p∗);
• 〈| p |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, for α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).




, then it follows that
β = πj , for some j ∈ I . By an application of rule (Enforce),
triggered by rules (recE) and (Rec), we have that:




 	= ∅, there is a possibly empty trace t′ ∈ pj

such that β · t′ is a prefix of some trace in p∗.
Inductive case. Let n ∈ N, for some n > 1. Let t be a trace
of go  {P} long n such that t is a prefix of some trace in
p∗

. Since n > 1, then t = t′′ · β, for some trace t′′ and
action β. By inductive hypothesis we have:
1) 〈|p∗|〉P {P} t
′′
−−−→ E {J}, where either E = 〈| p′ |〉PX
or E = Z, with Z = 〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-
term of p, and for some variable X and controller J ;
2) there is a trace t′ such that t′ ∈ p′ and t′′ · t′ is a prefix





We now analyse the possible transitions of the edit automa-
ton 〈| p′ |〉PX . We proceed by case analysis on the structure of
the property p′:
– Let p′ ≡ ε. By definition, the synthesis returns an
automaton variable X defined via an equation. Thus, we resort
to one of the other cases, depending on the definition of X.
– Let p′ ≡ p′1; p′2. By definition, the synthesis returns
〈| p′1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p′2 |〉PX , and Z 	= X. Thus, in order to
analyse the possible transitions of 〈| p′1 |〉PZ we resort to one of
the other two cases.
– Let p′ ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.p′i. By definition, the synthesis algorithm









Thus, the possible transitions of 〈| p′ |〉PX are:
• 〈| p′ |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX , for πi ∈ events(p∗);
• 〈| p′ |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, for α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).
We recall that t = t′′ · β is a prefix of some trace in p∗.














. It follows that β = πj , for some j ∈ I . Thus, by an
application of rule (Enforce) we have:
1) 〈| p′ |〉PX {J}
β−−→〈| p′j |〉PX {J ′}, for some J ′,










Finally, for t = t′′ · β, we derive the required result:
1) 〈| p∗ |〉PX {J}
t−−→ 〈| p′j |〉PX {J ′}, for some J ′, and










In order to prove Theorem 2 we need two lemmata.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of the synthesis): Let e = p∗, for some
p ∈  , and P be a set of actions such that events(e) ⊆
P . Let 〈|e|〉P
α1/β1−−−−−→ . . .
αn/βn−−−−−→ E be an arbitrary execution
trace of the synthesised automaton 〈|e|〉P . Then,






2) either E = 〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-term of p
and some automaton variable X, or E = Z, with Z =
〈| p′′ |〉PX , for some property p′′ sub-term of p, with p′′
possibly equal to p, and some automaton variables X, Z.
Proof: By induction on the length of the execution trace.
Base case. Let n = 1. Let 〈|p∗|〉P
α/β−−−→ E. As 〈|p∗|〉P 
X, for X = 〈| p |〉PX , this transition may only be due to an
application of rule (recE) because 〈| p |〉PX
α/β−−−→ E. Thus, we
proceed by case analysis on the structure of the property p.
– Let p ≡ ε. Impossible as p would not be well-formed.
– Let p ≡ p1; p2. By definition, the synthesis algorithm
returns 〈| p1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p2 |〉PX , and Z 	= X. Now, if p1 	= ε
then in order to analyse the transitions afforded by 〈| p1 |〉PZ
we resort to one of the other cases. Similarly, if p1 = ε
then 〈| p1 |〉PZ = Z, with Z = 〈| p2 |〉PX , and for the analysis
of 〈| p2 |〉PX we resort to one of the other cases.
– Let p ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.pi. By definition, the synthesis algo-









Thus, the edit automaton 〈| p |〉PX admits the following two
families of transitions:
• 〈| p |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| pi |〉PX , for πi ∈ events(e) ⊆ P;
• 〈| p |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, for and α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).





, for any i ∈ I , and 2) in the derivative 〈| pi |〉PX ,
the property pi is a sub-term of p. In the latter case, 1) τ̂ = ε




, and 2) Z = 〈| p |〉PX .
Inductive case. Let n ∈ N, with n > 1.
Let 〈|p∗|〉P
α1/β1−−−−−→ . . .
αn−1/βn−1−−−−−−−−−→ E′
αn/βn−−−−−→ E. By
inductive hypothesis we have that:






2) either E′ = 〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-term of p
and some automaton variable X, or E′ = Z, with Z =
〈| p′′ |〉PX , for some property p′′ sub-term of p, with p′′
possibly equal to p, and some automaton variables X, Z.
Let us focus on the transition E′
αn/βn−−−−−→ E. With a reasoning
similar to that of the base case, we derive that: 1) either β̂n




or β̂n is a prefix of some
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, and 2) either E = 〈| p′1 |〉PX , for some automaton
variable X and some property p′1 sub-term of p
′, or E = Z, with
Z = 〈| p′2 |〉PX , for some variables X and Z and some property p′2
sub-term of p′, or E = 〈| p′′1 |〉PX , for some variable X and some
property p′′1 sub-term of p
′′, or E = Z, with Z = 〈| p′′2 |〉PX , for
some variables X and Z and some property p′′2 sub-term of p
′′.
Thus, for t = t′ · βn, we derive that: 1) the trace t̂ = t̂′ · β̂n




, and 2) either E = 〈| q |〉PX ,
for some variable X and some property q sub-term of p, or
E = Z, with Z = 〈| r |〉PX , for some variables X and Z and
some property r sub-term of p.
Lemma 2 (Trace decomposition): Let e = p∗, for some
p ∈  , P ∈  and P be the set of all possible actions
of P such that events(e) ⊆ P . Then, for any execution trace
〈|e|〉P {P} β1−−−→ E1 {J1} β2−−−→ . . . βn−−−→ En {Jn} holds:
1) 〈|e|〉P
α1/β1−−−−−→ E1
α2/β2−−−−−→ . . .
αn/βn−−−−−→ En, with αi ∈ P ,
2) J0 = P and either Ji−1
αi−−−→ Ji or Ji = Ji−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof: By induction on the length n of the execution trace
〈|e|〉P {P} β1−−−→ E1 {J1} β2−−−→ . . . βn−−−→ En {Jn}.
Base case. Let n = 1. Let 〈|e|〉P  {P} β−−→ E  {J}.
The following facts hold: (i) P ≡ X , for X = tick.W ,
can only yield a tick-action by an application of rule (Rec);
(ii) the synthesis function in Table III never returns an edit
automaton that suppresses a tick-action; (iii) events(e) ⊆ P .
From these facts and by an application of rule (Enforce),
triggered by applications of rule (recE) and (Rec), we derive
that: 1) 〈|e|〉P
tick/tick−−−−−→ E, and 2) P tick−−−→ W , for W ∈ 	

.
Inductive case. Let n > 1. By inductive hypothesis we have:
1) 〈|e|〉P
α1/β1−−−−−→ E1
α2/β2−−−−−→ . . .
αn−1/βn−1−−−−−−−−−→ En−1, αi ∈ P ,
2) J0 = P and either Ji−1
αi−−−→ Ji or Ji = Ji−1, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Consider the action En−1  {Jn−1} βn−−−→ En  {Jn}.
By an application of Lemma 1 we have that either En−1 =
〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-term of p, or En−1 = Z
with Z = 〈| p′′ |〉PX for some property p′′ sub-term of p, with
p′′ possibly equal to p, and some automaton variable X and Z.
We proceed by case analysis on the structure of p′ (the case
analysis for p′′ is similar):
– Let p′ ≡ ε. By definition, its synthesis returns X. Thus,
we resort to one of the other cases.
– Let p′ ≡ p′1; p′2. By definition, the synthesis returns
〈| p′1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p′2 |〉PX and Z 	= X. Thus, in order to analyse
the transitions of 〈| p1 |〉PZ we resort to one of the other cases.
– Let p′ ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.p′i. By definition, the synthesis of









Thus, the possible transitions of 〈| p′ |〉PX are:
• 〈| p′ |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX , for πi ∈ events(e) ⊆ P ,
• 〈| p′ |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, for α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).
Let us analyse the possible transitions of Jn−1.
1) Let Jn−1
πi−−−→ Jn, for πi ∈ events(e) ⊆ P . As
〈| p′ |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX , by an application of the rule (Enforce)
we have 〈| p |〉PX  {Jn−1}
πi−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX  {Jn}, which
concludes the proof of this case.
2) Let Jn−1
end−−−→ Jn, with πi 	= end for all i ∈ I . By
an application of rule (Mitigation), the edit automaton may
produce autonomously the action πi. Thus, we have that
〈| p′ |〉PX {Jn−1}
πi−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX {Jn}, with Jn = Jn−1,
which concludes the proof of this case.
3) Let Jn−1
α−−→ Jn, for α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).
Since 〈| p′ |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, by an application of rule (Enforce), we
have 〈| p′ |〉PX {Jn−1}
τ−−→ Z{Jn}, which concludes the
proof of this case.
4) Let Jn−1
tick−−−→ Jn, with πi 	= tick for all i ∈ I . As
the monitor 〈| p′ |〉PX does not allow tick-actions, the monitored
controller 〈| p′ |〉PX {Jn−1} may not perform any action.
Let us prove Theorem 2 (Soundness).
Proof: Let t = β1 · . . . · βn be an execution trace such
that 〈|e|〉P  {P} t−−→ E  {J}, for some E ∈  and
some controller J . By an application of Lemma 2 there exist
Ei ∈  and αi ∈ P , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that:
〈|e|〉P
α1/β1−−−−−→ E1
α2/β2−−−−−→ . . .
αn/βn−−−−−→ En = E .





Let us prove Proposition 3 (Deadlock-freedom).
Proof: We prove that if 〈|e|〉P  {P} t−−→ E  {J}, for
some E ∈  and some J , then there exist β, E′ and J ′ such
that E{J} β−−→ E′ {J ′}. We proceed by case analysis on
the structure of the controller J .
– Let J = tickk−l.S, for 0 ≤ l ≤ k−1. In this case, we have
to show that the enforcer allows tick-actions, i.e., E
tick/tick−−−−−→
E′, thus β = tick. According to the syntax of our controllers,
there are two different possibilities to reach the controller J :
either P
tick−−−→ . . . tick−−−→ J or P t
′
−−→ end.X end−−−→ P tick−−−→
. . .
tick−−−→ J , for some trace t′. We focus on the latter case, as
the former is simpler. By an application of Lemma 2 we can
decompose the trace 〈|e|〉P {P} t−−→ E{J} as




α2/β2−−−−−→ . . .
αn/βn−−−−−→ En = E, αi ∈ P
2) J0=P , Jn= J, either Ji−1
αi−−−→ Ji or Ji=Ji−1, for 1≤i≤n.
By inspection on the synthesis algorithm we know that
the edit automata resulting from the synthesis never suppress
tick-actions and end-actions. Thus, the execution trace of item






tick/tick−−−−−→ . . .
tick/tick−−−−−→
En = E. By an application of Lemma 1, the trace t̂ is a
260
Authorized licensed use limited to: Universita degli Studi di Verona. Downloaded on August 19,2020 at 08:29:27 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 




; as e is k-sleeping, it follows
that t = t′ · end · tickl, with t′ = β1 · ... · βn−l−1. Still by
an application of Lemma 1 we have that either E = 〈| p′ |〉PX ,
for some property p′ sub-term of property p, or E = Z with
Z = 〈| p′′ |〉PX for some property p′′ sub-term of p, with p′′
possibly equal to p, and some automaton variables X and Z.
Summarising, E comes from the synthesis of some property.
By inspection on the synthesis algorithm we know that the
edit automata resulting from the synthesis never deadlock,
i.e., E
α/β−−−→ E′, for some E′, α and β. By Lemma 1
the trace t̂ · β̂ must be a prefix of some trace in e. As
e is k-sleeping and the edit automata resulting from the
synthesis never suppress tick-actions, it holds that E
tick/tick−−−−−→ E′.
As J = tickh−l.S
tick−−−→ tickh−l−1.S = J ′, we have that
E{J} β−−→ E′ {J ′}, for β = tick, as required.
– Let J ∈   ∪  ∪	
. We have to show that
for any α-action of the controller there is an α/β-action of the
enforcer, for some β. By an application of Lemma 1, we have
that either E = 〈| p′ |〉PX , for some property p′ sub-term of p
and some automaton variable X, or E = Z, with Z = 〈| p′′ |〉PX ,
for some property p′′ sub-term of p, with p′′ possibly equal
to p, and some automaton variables X, Z. We proceed by case
analysis on the structure of p′ (the case for p′′ is similar):
• Let p′ ≡ ε. By definition it is synthesised into X. Thus,
we resort to one of the other cases.
• Let p′ ≡ p′1; p′2. By definition, the synthesis algorithm
returns 〈| p′1 |〉PZ , for Z = 〈| p′2 |〉PX and Z 	= X. Thus, we
resort to one of the other cases.
• Let p′ ≡ ⋃i∈I πi.p′i. By definition, the synthesis of Ta-









Thus, the possible transitions of 〈| p′ |〉PX are:
– 〈| p′ |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX , for πi ∈ events(e) ⊆ P ,
– 〈| p′ |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, for α ∈ P \ (∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}).
Now, let us consider the possible transitions of J .
1) Let J
πi−−−→ J ′, for πi ∈ events(e) ⊆ P . As we
have 〈| p′ |〉PX
πi/πi−−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX , by an application of rule
(Enforce) it follows that E{J} πi−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX {J ′},
as required, for E′ = 〈| p′i |〉PX and β = πi.
2) Let J
end−−−→ J ′, with πi 	= end for all i ∈ I . By an ap-
plication of rule (Mitigation), we have 〈| p′ |〉PX {J}
πi−−−→
〈| p′i |〉PX {J}, for some i ∈ I , as required, for β = πi.
3) Let J
tick−−−→ J ′, with πi 	= tick for all i ∈ I . As J ∈
 ∪∪	
, this tick-action can be derived only
by an application of one of the following transition rules:
(TimeoutS), (TimeoutInC) and (TimeoutOutC). By inspection
on these three rules, we derive that there is a J ′′ such
that J
α−−→ J ′′, for some α ∈ (Chn∗ ∪ Sens) ⊆ P . Now,
depending on α, by an application of rule (Enforce) we
derive that either 〈| p′ |〉PX {J}
πi−−−→ 〈| p′i |〉PX {J ′′} or
〈| p′ |〉PX {J}
τ−−→ Z{J ′′}, as required.
4) Let J
α−−→ J ′, for α ∈ P\(∪i∈Iπi ∪ {tick, end}). Since
〈| p′ |〉PX
α/τ−−−→ Z, by an application of rule (Enforce) we
have 〈| p′ |〉PX {J}
τ−−→ Z{J ′}, as required.
In order to prove Proposition 4 we need a definition.
Definition 8: Let pre() : 
∪ ∪ ∪∪
	
 →  be a function that given a controller J returns
an upper bound to the number of transitions that may be
performed by J before an end-action. The definition follows:
pre(X)  pre(tick.W ), with X = tick.W
pre(tick.W )  1 + pre(W )
pre(∑i∈I si.SiS)  1 +max (pre(S),max i∈I(pre(Si)))
pre(∑i∈I ci.CiC)  1 +max (pre(C),max i∈I(pre(Ci)))
pre(c.C1C2)  1 +max (pre(C1), pre(C2))
pre(a.A)  1 + pre(A)
pre(end.X)  0 .
Let us prove Proposition 4 (Divergence-freedom).
Proof: Let e = p∗, for p ∈ . Let P ∈ 
, P
be the set of all possible actions of P , and t a trace such that
〈|e|〉P  {P} t−−→ E  {J}. We define k = pre(P ) + kp,





that, by definition of our controllers, pre(P ) is always finite.
Furthermore, kp is finite too as local properties in  do
not contain Kleene operators. As a consequence, k is finite.
Thus, we prove that if E  {J} t
′
−−→ E′  {J ′}, with
| t′ |≥ k, then end ∈ t′. More precisely, we prove that whenever
E  {J} t
′
−−→ E′  {J ′}, with | t′ |≥ pre(J) + kp, then
end ∈ t′. The result follows as J is a derivative of P , and hence
pre(J)≤pre(P ). We proceed by structural induction on J .
– Let J ≡ end.X . Let E  {J} t
′
−−→ E′  {J ′} such that
| t′ |≥ pre(end.X) + kp ≥ kp. We reason by contradiction
supposing that end 	∈ t′. Since J may only perform an end-
action, it follows that t′ is entirely derived by applications of
rule (Mitigation). In fact, rule (Enforce) cannot be used in the
derivation of t′ as end 	∈ t′ and our synthesis never suppress
end-actions. Notice that actions inferred by applications of rule
(Mitigation) are always different from τ ; thus, t̂′ = t′ and





. Since | t′ |≥ kp, where kp is the length




, and p is well-formed, it follows
that end ∈ t′. In contradiction with the assumption end 	∈ t′.
– Let J ≡ ∑i∈I si.SiS. Let E  {J} t
′
−−→ E′  {J ′}
such that | t′ |≥ pre(J)+kp. Let β be the first action of t′, i.e.,
t′ = β · t′′, for some trace t′′, such that E  {J} β−−→ E′′ 
{J ′′} t
′′
−−−→ E′ {J ′}, for some E′′ and J ′′. By inspection on
J , it follows that either J ′′ = Si, for some i ∈ I , or J ′′ = S.
Since | t′ |≥ pre(J)+kp, it follows that | t′′ |≥ pre(J ′′)+kp.
As J ′′ is sub-term of J , by inductive hypothesis it follows that
end ∈ t′′. Thus, end ∈ t′ = β · t′′, as required.
The other cases are similar to the previous ones.
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